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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE F. MONTOYA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BERTHANA INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, INC., and 
ROBERT E. SANDERS and 
SHIRLEY M. SANDE'RS, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11113 
The Appellant will be referred to as plaintiff 
and the Respondent Berthana Investment Corpor-
ation, Inc. as defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for wrongful death against 
defendant Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc., 
lessor of certain premises, and defendants Robert 
f E. Sanders and Shirley M. Sanders, husband and 
; wife, lessees. 
I DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendant Berthana's 
Motion for Summary Judgment made pursuant to 
1 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. and dismissed plaintiff's com-
plaint as to it (R. 23). Defendants Robert E. San-
ders and Shirley M. Sanders remain in the action 
and are not involved in this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the trial court's 
ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The general background of the case is set forth 
in the plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" at Page 2 
through 4 of his Brief. Beginning at page 4 of his 
Brief, plaintiff sets forth in paragraphs numbered 
A through K his claims. However, since some of 
those claims are at variance with the uncontrovert-
ed facts as established by affidavits or sworn an-
swer to Interrogatories, which are in the file, some 
discussion of the factual background and circum-
stances of the action is considered necessary. 
Under subparagraph "C", (Appellant's Brief, 
page 4), it is asserted that Berthana (the lessor) 
would allow no alterations of the premises by the 
lessee without prior written consent of the lessor. 
The actual provision in the lease dealing with this 
matter is set forth in Paragraph 11 of the Lease, 
which is attached to Defendant's Answer to Inter-
rogatories ( R. 11) , and provides: 
"That the said parties of the second part 
(lessee Sanders) will not make or permit to 
be made any changes or alterations in the 
2 
building or in the electrical wiring therein 
without obtaining the written assent thereto 
of the party of the first part (Berthana)." 
In subparagraph "H" (Appellant's Brief, page 
5), the plaintiff states a legal conclusion as well as 
assuming the existence of legal duty on the part of 
this defendant, in claiming that Berthana knew that 
there was "no proper railing or other protective 
device to prevent skaters from falling into or being 
pushed against said arm rests which constituted a 
risk to skaters using the rink". Similarly in sub-
paragraph '·'I" (Appellant's Brief, page 5), the 
plaintiff states: "It (Berthana) knew that Sanders 
(lessees) would use said premises for skating pur-
poses before the area could be put in a reasonably 
safe condition and that Lessees would not make 
such changes." These statements assume that the 
premises were unsafe and that defendant Berthana 
recognized that they were unsafe by inferring that 
changes were to be made in the condition of the 
premises. These conclusions should be disregarded. 
The Lease contains all the conditions between lessor 
and lessee. Paragraph 5 of the Lease provides: 
"That said parties of the second part 
accept this lease and the premises describ~d 
therein in the condition and state of repair 
that they are now in, and agree to occupy the 
same in a lawful manner and for lawful pur-
poses only; and will at. their own. expens~s 
keep the said premises m all particulars m 
good condition and state of repair." 
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Subparagraph "J" (Appellant's Brief, page 5), 
states: "that both defendants knew, or should have 
known, of the hazards in the construction of said 
area, when used for skating purposes and of the 
possibility of injury to persons skating there, espe-
cially to children." These purported allegations of 
fact are conclusionary. There are no facts founded 
upon affidavit or otherwise which support these 
conclusions which are at variance with the terms of 
the Lease. 
Lastly under subparagraph '"K" (Appellant's 
Brief, page 5), the plainti'ff admits that the de-
ceased child was "pushed or fell violently" against 
an arm rest of a chair from which he suffered per-
sonal injury resulting in his death. The uncontro-
verted affidavit of Alma Clare states that he saw 
the deceased boy pushed hard from behind by an 
older girl with whom he was skating, which caused 
the deceased boy to go out of control. The complaint 
also contains claims against Robert E. Sanders and 
Shirley M. Sanders, co-defendant lessees, for negli· 
gently and carelessly failing to provide proper sup-
ervision and permitting skaters to be exposed to the 
hazards from the "speeding, rushing and jostling 
of other skaters", and in failing to render necessary 
aid to the injured boy. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DE-
FENDANT BERTHANA INVESTMENT COR-
PORATION AND kGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
A. The sole cause of the injury and death of 
the child was the act of a third party. 
The crux of the plaintiff's claim is that the de-
fendant as a lessor knew or should have known, that 
the premises were so negligently and imperfectly 
constructed as to be unsafe because of arm rests on 
seats located on an elevated platform adjacent to 
the skating and dancing area. The plaintiff charges 
this defendant with knowledge that there was "the 
possibility of injury to persons skating there", 
(Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, R. 15, Paragraph 
4), and asserts that Berthana should be held re-
sponsible even though the plaintiff was pushed into 
the arm rest by a playmate over whom this defen-
dant had no control or right of control. 
After examining the pleadings, affidavits and 
answers in interrogatories, the trial court conclud-
ed that a cause of action against Berthana did not 
exist ( R. 23). 
"The primary purpose of the summary judg-
ment procedure is to pierce the allegations of the 
pleadings", and show that although issues may have 
been raised in the pleadings, there is no genuine 
5 
issue of material fact. Where uncontroverted facts 
exist through affidavits or other verified pleadings, 
the mere reliance upon an amended complaint is 
insufficient because the pleadings when challenged 
by proof are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. 
Dupler vs. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 ( 1960). 
It is clear from the affidavits on file that the 
cause of the injury was not a defective structure, 
but the independent act of a third person. A sworn 
affidavit of an eye witness, Alma Clare, states that 
he observed a little Mexican girl, with whom the 
deceased was skating, "reach out and push the boy 
forward into the arm rest ... he was pushed hard 
and out of control when he hit the chair ... This 
was the first I had seen of any 'horse play' between 
the two children or anyone else skating on the floor." 
The roller rink was not crowded at the time (R. 12). 
This version of the accident is not controvert-
ed, but is in fact supported by plaintiff's own state-
ment in his answer to an interrogatory (R. 9). He 
states: 
"The deceased son and other children 
were playing with each other as they ska~ed 
back and forth on the floor and that durmg 
this procedure it appears that one Miss Apa-
ricio of 1543-27th Street, Ogden, Utah, and 
maybe some others, collided with him so~1e­
way and he fell against one of the protruding 
ann rests of the bench, and as a result, he 
died from the injuries." 
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The defendant Berthana had no right under 
the lease to supervise the patrons of the rink. The 
lease provided in part as follows: 
"5. The said parties of the second part 
accept this lease and the premises described 
therein in the condition and state of repair 
that they are now in, and agree to occupy the 
same in a lawful manner and for lawful pur-
poses only; and will at their own expense keep 
the said premises in all particulars in good 
condition and state of repair." 
"6. That the party of the first part shall 
not be liable for any damages for failure to 
keep said premises in good repair and shall 
not be liable . . . for any damage occasioned 
by acts of neglect of cotenants or others, ex-
cept party of the first." 
"9. To allow the party of the first part 
or its legal representatives free access to the 
premises hereby leased at all reasonable times 
for the purpose of examining, inspecting and 
exhibiting the same and to make any needed 
repairs or alterations of said premises that 
the said party of the first part may see fit to 
make without unnecessarily interferring with 
the operation of business of parties of the 
second part; also to allow to have placed upon 
said premises at all times during the last sixty 
days of this lease, for rent signs, and will not 
interfere with the same." 
The injury resulted, not from any defect in con-
struction of the building premises, but from the in-
tervening act of a third party. There is sufficient 
evidence in the record to sustain the trail court's 
ruling on that basis alone. 
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B. Defendant Berthana breached no duty to 
plaintiff's decedent. ' 
The general common law rule concerning the 
liability of a lessor to patrons of a lessee, is stated 
in 2 Harper and James, Law of 'Torts, Sec. 2716: 
"The duty of care to make or keep prem. 
ises safe - where it exists at all - generally 
rests upon the person who has occupancy or 
possession of the premises. If premises are 
leased, the tenant is generally considered as 
entitled to exclusive possession of them, and 
therefore, alone liable to visitors for injuries 
caused by their dangerous condition or 
use ... " 
This general rule was followed in Wilson vs. 
Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368 (1925), 
where the Utah Supreme Court held that a land-
lord was not liable for injuries sustained by the 
lessee due to the collapse of a wall on the premises 
where the defective condition was not a latent one 
but was open and obvious to the tenant and there 
were no circumstances which would otherwise have 
misled the tehant. In Reams vs. Taylor, 31 Utah 
288, 87 Pac.1089 (1906), atenantwasinjuredby 
falling into an uncovered cellar way at an apart-
ment house. In denying recovery against the land-
lord the court said: 
"It will, we think, not be disputed t~at, 
in the absence of deceit or misrepresentat~on 
by the landlord, the tenant will take the r;sk 
of the con di ti on of the premises leased by him, 
and, if injured by reason of the unsafe con-
8 
di ti on, especially when open and unconcealed, 
as a_ general rule, cannot recover against the 
landlord for such injury." 
See also Hatzis vs. U. S. Fuel Co., 82 Utah 38, 21 
P.2d 862 ( 1933). 
It is well established that the duties and liabil-
ities of the landlord to persons on the leased prem-
ises by consent of the tenant are the same as those 
owed to the tenant himself. Where the tenant has 
no redress against the landlord, those on the prem-
ises at the tenant's invitation are likewise barred. 
See 32 Am. Jur. Sec. 665. 
The plaintiff cites language from an annota-
tion appearing in 123 A.L.R. 868. 
That annotation refers to seven prior annota-
tions which discuss the legal responsibility of a les-
sor to patrons who have come to the premises at the 
invitation of the lessee for amusement purposes. An 
exception to the general rule of caveat emptor with 
respect to a landlord's liability with the restriction 
hereafter noted, is generally recognized in relation 
to those who enter upon the leased premises for pur-
poses of amusement. 
"It is generally recognized that the lessor 
of the property for public amusement owes to 
the public, at least as to latent def eels, ~he 
duty of exercising ordinary care to proVIde 
against defects in the premises which render 
them unsafe for the use intended." 123 A.L.R. 
872 (Emphasis Added). 
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An examination of the cases cited in that an-
notation, and in the prior seven annotations, refers ' 
to cases where latent defects are present which 
result in eventual injury to a patron of a tenant. The 
cases cited in the annotation generally refer to la-
tent defects in the structure of the building or de-
vice or to its state of repair. Even if a defect were 
found to exist in the arm of the chair in the leased 
premises in the present case, it was open and obvi-
ous, just as the absence of a down-spout was open 
and obvious to the tenant in Wilson vs. Woodriiff, 
65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368 (1925), discussed above, 
in which the court sustained a dismissal of the ac-
tion. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that it is a 
jury question as to whether or not the landlord knew, 
or should have known, that persons using the floor 
for roller skating purposes, might sustain injury if 
projected into the arm rest. (Appellant's Brief, page 
9). He claims that the absence of a protective rail-
ing was a structural defect. However, the absence 
of a protective railing, even if it were found to be 
a structural defect, was as open and obvious to the 
tenant as to anyone else. Even so, under the same 
circumstances, it is just as logical to assume that a 
landlord could foresee injury to a patron of the les-
see resulting from being pushed into a protective 
railing as to impose upon him the clairvoyance nec-
essary to anticipate injury as a result of a patron 
being pushed into an arm rest. The plaintiff seeks 
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Lo impose a burden upon the lessor which the law 
does not recognize. 
In any event, the landlord is to be judged by 
the test of reasonable foreseeability and not by hind-
sight. He is entitled to assume that the premises 
will be used in a reasonable way for the purposes 
anticipated. The lease prohibiting the lessee from 
making changes in the "building" did not apply to 
furnishings within the building. The use of the chair 
was discretionary with the lessee and was exclusive-
ly under his control. It did not constitute a structur-
al defect and there is no claim that it was in any 
state of disrepair. The arm of the chair was only 
coincidentally involved. It may as well have been a 
wall, protective railing, another chair, a table or 
any other fixture or thing which happened to be 
in the path of the boy, who was pushed out of con-
trol. 
The widely cited Utah case of Larson vs. Cal-
der's Park Company, 54 Utah 325, 332, 343, 180 
Pac. 599 (1919), is most helpful. In that case the 
defendant leased a building which he had used, and 
which he knew was to be used, as a shooting gallery. 
It was immediately adjacent to a "well beaten path" 
used by patrons visiting the amusement park in 
which the shooting gallery was located. There were 
wide gaps in the walls and holes were present in the 
building through which glancing bullets could pass. 
The plaintiff, while walking along the path, during 
a visit to the amusement park, was struck in the eye 
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by a glancing bullet and sustained injury. The fol-
lowing discussion is taken from the opinion : 
"From the undisputed evidence it is man-
ifest that by using the building which was in-
tended for use as a shooting gallery and which 
was leased for that purpose, in the condition it 
was in when leased, the projectiles in passing 
from the guns would necessarily be deflected 
from the target through the openings in the 
wall of the building, and would thus probably 
come in contact with a person passing the 
building along the passage-way and injure 
him ... It was the unsafe condition of the 
building as leased, however, which would ex-
pose the passer-by to danger and not the sole 
act of the tenant, for the reason that, if the 
tenant used the building at all as a shooting 
gallery in the condition in which it was, the 
danger would certainly be constantly immin-
ent . . . Here the evidence is that for years 
prior to the execution of the lease by appel-
lant the shooting gallery as operated had been 
a dangerous nuisance. The appellant must 
have known this fact. It also knew of the pas-
sage-way or path, and knew that it was used 
by patrons of the resort, and that every per-
son using it was in danger from flying bullets 
or parts of bullets which often glance from 
the targets and, when not imbedded in the 
walls, pass through the cracks and holes there-
in ... Any man of ordinary intelligence 
would know that tenants would probably con-
tinue its use as a shooting gallery, and under 
the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, 
it may be fairly said that a continuance of the 
manner in which it had been used was contem-
12 
plated by the parties to the lease." (Empha-
sis added). 
The court continued : 
"The weight of authority is to the effect 
that if an owner creates a dangerous nuisance 
on his land, he cannot avoid liability to a per-
son injured thereby by leasing to another his 
land, with the nuisance thereon, especially in 
a case where it may be reasonably expected 
that the lessee will put the premises to a use 
that will continue the nuisance. 
* * * 
"We agree with appellant's counsel that 
as a building by itself the so-called shooting 
gallery was not a nuisance. As a bare building 
it was innocuous. When targets were placed 
in position and the other paraphernalia in-
stalled, it was still harmless. It did not become 
an active and dangerous instrumentality un-
til a gun was placed in the hands of a patron, 
and not until he fired the gun. Then the mis-
siles became active agents of danger, and they 
were dangerous then because the walls of the 
building had not been protected, and because 
the holes and cracks were permitted to be in 
the walls and because bullets and fragments 
of lead which glanced from the targets and 
went through openings in the walls were like-
ly to hit and injure an innocent third party. 
All of this could have been foreseen by the 
appellant at the time the lease was executed." 
(Emphasis added). 
Our court has defined "dangerous" as ''full of 
or attended with danger, risk, hazardous, perilous, 
full of risk, etc." Henrie vs. Rockey Mtn. Packing 
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Corp., 113 Utah 415, 418, 196 P.2d 487, 489 (1948). 
"Imminent" means '''likely to occur at any moment· 
impending." The Random House Dictionary of th~ 
English Language, The Unabridged Ed., 1966, p. 
712. Nuisance is defined in Section 76-43-1, U.C.A., 
1953, as follows: 
"Whatever is dangerous to human life 
or health, and whatever renders soil, air, wat-
er or food impure or unwholesome, are de-
clared to be nuisances ... " 1 
Although this definition is contained in the criminal 
code the maintenance of a nuisance can give rise to 
a civil action, making the definition applicable to 
a civil case. Dahl vs. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 71 Utah 1, 
262 ·Pac. 269 ( 1927). However, nuisance is similar-
ly defined in Section 78-38-1, U.C.A., 1953: 
"Anything which is injurious to health, 
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an 
obstruction to the free use of property, so as 
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment 
of life or property, is a nuisance and the sub-
ject of an action. Such action may be brought 
by any person whose property is injuriously 
affected, or whose personal enjoyment is les-
sened by a nuisance; and by the judgment the 
nuisance may be enjoined or (abated) and 
damages may also be recovered." 
The basis upon which liability is imposed upon 
a landowner for injury to a patron of his lessee is 
that the public policy will not permit him to main· 
tain a dangerous nuisance, or one that is imminent· 
ly dangerous, and escape responsibility by leasing 
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the property which contains it. As is apparent from 
the Calder's Park decision, the nuisance must be of 
such a nature that the landowner knows, or can be 
charged with knowledge, of its imminently danger-
ous condition, when the property is placed to the 
use intended. The imminently dangerous condition 
of the shooting gallery, considering the fact that the 
building which housed it had large cracks and holes 
through which the fragments of bullets could escape, 
is certainly to be contrasted with a spectator's chair 
elevated on a platform above the skating and danc-
ing floor where spectators or patrons might sit in 
comfort and safety. There is nothing about the pre-
sence or the use of the leased premises, when used 
in the manner in which it was intended, which sug-
gests them to be "imminently dangerous'' or even 
''dangerous" in any respect. The chair was placed 
there for the convenience of patrons. If this furnish-
ing is declared a "dangerous nuisance" creating a 
condition which made a danger "constantly immin-
ent", as defined in Calder's Park, it is submitted 
that virtually any furnishing or fixture located in 
a building to which the public is invited, could read-
ily fall into this category, because in the course of 
events accidents occur under circumstances which 
cannot be reasonably foreseen. This is especially 
true under circumstances where the injury is pre-
cipitated by the intervention of a third party. An 
automobile is not considered to be a "dangerous nui-
sance" nor imminently dangerous even though the 
15 
use of that agency accounts for thousand of deaths 
and injuries each year. If the theory of liability of 
the plaintiff is carried to its logical extreme by 
declaring an innocuous chair a nuisance, there would 
seem to be no limit to its extension and any agency 
which is involved in accidental injury to another 
could be condemned as a "dangerous nuisance" and 
the owner charged with responsibiity for the injury 
and resulting damage. 
The court in Calder's Park recognized the gen-
eral rule of law as announced in Reams vs. Taylor, 
31 Utah 288, 87 Pac. 1089 (1906), that a tenant, 
in the absence of deceit or misrepresentation by the 
landlord, accepts the risks of the condition of the 
premises as he finds them when the alleged unsafe 
condition is open and unconcealed. The court recog-
nized in the Calder's Park case that in order for an 
exception to that rule to be applicable, that the 
condition in the premises not only must be a danger-
ous nuisance, but the landlord must know of it, or 
the circumstances must be such as to charge him 
with knowledge that the use of the facility in the 
leased condition for the intended purpose, that 
"danger would certainly be constantly imminent." 
The court appears to be speaking in terms of injury 
being the probable result of using the premises, as 
opposed to the mere possibility of injury. It is sub-
mitted that none of the conditions necessary to im-
pose liability upon a landlord for injury to a patron 
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of a lessee, as outlined in Calder's Park case, are 
present in the one at bar. 
The case of Barrett vs. Lake Ontario Beach Co., 
66 N.E. 969 (N.Y. 1903) cited by appellant is sim-
ilar to the Calder's Park case. There the landlord 
leased a water toboggan slide in connection with a 
swimming facility. The patron would slide down a 
chute into the lake on a toboggan from a platform 
approximately 25 feet above the ground. The struc-
ture was made in such a way that water would ac-
cumulate on the platform and the steps. The only 
protective railing on the platform was 21" high. The 
landlord was held liable for injury to a patron who 
slipped on the wet surface and fell from the plat-
form. The nature of the activity as in the Utah case 
was surrounded with risk. 
In the Gibson vs. Shelby County Fair case, 44 
N.W. 2d 362, 364 (Iowa 1950), also cited by appel-
lant, a 17 year old boy was injured while watching 
a hotrod race. He was standing near the race track 
where patrons were invited to be when he was struck 
by a wheel which became detached from a racing 
car. The track was under lease for the purpose of 
racing but was designed for harness racing. The 
only protective barrier was a delapidated web wire 
fence, which was satisfactory for horse racing but 
was wholly inadequate to prevent injury, which 
could have been reasonably foreseen, from racing 
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automobiles. The court held the exception was ap-
plicable: 
"When pre:nises are leased for a public 
use the owner is charged with liability if a 
~emI:>er: o~ the public, rightfully on the prem-
ises, is mJured because of a defective or dan-
gerous con di ti on that was known to the lessor 
or by reasonable inspection might have been 
known at the time of leasing." (Citing Lar-
son vs. Calder's Park Co., case, 54 Utah 325, 
180 Pac. 599). 
* * * 
"'The word "defective' in the rule means 
construction that is unfit for the leased use, 
as well as a state of disrepair." 
The case dealt with a defective structure as 
determined in light of the hazards contemplated in 
the activity to be carried on in the leased premises. 
The track was built for harness racing. There is 
certainly a substantially greater risk involved to 
patrons watching hotrod racing from the unprotect-
ed sidelines, than when watching harness races from 
the same position. In that case, as in the Calder's 
Park case, upon which the court relied, the patron 1 
was injured as a direct result of being unprotected 
from the hazards necessarily involved in the contem· 
plated activity of the lessee, and not as a result of 
an act of a fellow patron as in the case at bar. 
In Hamilton vs. Union Oil Company, 339 P.2d 
440 (Ore., 1959), the plaintiff sued the lessor com-
pany and the lessee for injury resulting when she 
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fell because of claimed defective construction of 
steps within the building to which she was invited, 
and where she was present for the purpose of pay-
ing a bill. The court sustained an involuntary non-
suit against the Union Oil Company, lessor. The 
court distinguished that case from Larson vs. Cal-
der's Park Company, 54 Utah 325, 180 Pac. 599 
( 1919), in observing: 
" 'This is not a case of an incipient nui-
sance' ... the governing principle is as stated 
by Crompton, J., in Grandy vs. Juber, 5 Best 
and S. 73, 485, quoted with approval in Lewis 
vs. Jakes' Famous Crawfish, 143 Ore. 340, 
346, 336 P.2d 352: 
' ... But to bring liability home to the 
owner the nuisance must be one which 
is in its very essence and nature a nui-
sance at the time of the letting and not 
merely something which is capable of 
being thereafter rendered a nuisance 
by the tennant ... ' 
"Similarly the court said in Whalen vs. 
Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 32 N.E. 2d 393, 32 
Am. Jur. 537, Landlord and Tenant, Section 
669: 
'. . . If the premises can be used by the 
tenant in the manner intended by the 
landlord, either as shown by the con-
struction of the premises or by the 
terms of the lease, or by other evidence, 
without becoming a nuisance, the land-
lord is not liable for the acts or neglect 
of the acts of the tenant which creates 
the nuisance. If a tenant creates the 
nuisance without authority of the land-
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lord and after he has entered into oc-
cupation as a tenant, the landlord is 
not liable'." 
The lease indicates that dancing and roller skat-
ing could be carried on in the premises. There is no 
suggestion from any source, not even in counsel's 
argument, that the use of the premises for a rolling 
skating rink would create a ''''dangerous nuisance". 
1 
The only hazard which was present was that 
necessarily incurred by engaging in roller skating. 
If there was lack of supervision, such was the sole 
responsibility of the lessee. 
Similar cases to the one at hand have repeatedly 
denied recovery to a patron. See Randall vs. Pioneer 
Hotel, 71 Ariz. 10, 222 P.2d 986 (1950), where a 
patron fell on a public dance floor, and Maglin vs. ! 
Peoples' City Bank, 141 Pa. Supp. 329, 14 A.2d 827 
( 1940), which denied recovery for injury to a pat-
ron because of the collapse of a board in the floor 
of a public bathhouse. The court also denied appli-
cation of the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 359 (also 
cited by plaintiff) because there were not large 
numbers of persons admitted to the bathhouse. In 
the present case there was not a large crowd at 
the time of the accident (R. 12 Affidavit of Alma 
Clare). See also Sand vs. Theriot, 49 S.2d 484 (La. 
1950) and Jackson vs. Public Service Co., 86 N.H. 
81, 163 A. 504 ( 1932), wherein the right of a pat-
ron to recover from the lessor for injuries sustained 
while on the premises at the invitation of lessee was 
denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
We need not look beyond established and long 
standing Utah precedent to resolve the issues pre-
sented in this case. Reams vs. Taylor, 31 Utah 288, 
87 Pac. 1089 ( 1906), announced the rule that in 
the absence of deceit or misrepresentation by the 
landlord, the tenant accepts the risk of the condition 
of the premises, and, if injury results because of an 
unsafe condition, especially one which is open and 
unconcealed, there can be no recovery against the 
landlord. This rule of law was followed in Wilson 
vs. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368 (1925). 
Larsen vs. Calder's Park Company, 54 Utah 325, 
180 Pac. 599 ( 1919), recognized a limited exception 
to the general rule under circumstances where the 
landlord "creates a dangerous nuisance" on his land 
which has characteristics such that danger is "con-
stantly imminent", and he knows, or is charged with 
knowledge, that the nuisance is to be continued by 
the lessees and injury to a patron probable the 
then liability for injury resulting to a patron of 
lessee can be extended to include the lessor. The 
opinion seems to imply that the landlord must be 
able to reasonably foresee that the contemplated 
use would result in probable injury to a innocent 
person. Plaintiff suggests thatthere was only a ''pos-
sibility" of injury (R. 15, para 4). Since the prem-
ises were not such as to constitute a "dangerous nui-
sance" the rule in Reams & Wilson applies, and any 
defect even if the arm chair were considered to be 
' such, was open and obvious. However, there is no 
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indication that the arm chair was in any way un-
safe. It was located on a platform off the skating 
floor. Certainly it did not constitute a "dangerous 
nuisance" which could be found to present a "con-
stantly imminent" danger which would result in 
probable injury to patrons of the facility. 
It is submitted that the pleadings, admissions 
and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact on matters necessary 
to determine as a matter of law that plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover from the defendant Berthana, 
as lessor, because defendant breached no duty to 
plantiff's decedent, and secondly, the accident 
resulting in the Montoya child's injury and death, as 
unfortunate as it was, resulted soley from the act 
of another patron. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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